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Abstract—This paper studies novel attack and defense strate-
gies, based on a class of stealthy attacks, namely the zero-
dynamics attack (ZDA), for multi-agent control systems. ZDA
poses a formidable security challenge since its attack signal is
hidden in the null-space of the state-space representation of the
control system and hence it can evade conventional detection
methods. An intuitive defense strategy builds on changing the
aforementioned representation via switching through a set of
carefully crafted topologies. In this paper, we propose realistic
ZDA variations where the attacker is aware of this topology-
switching strategy, and hence employs the following policies to
avoid detection: (i) “pause (update and resume) attack” before
(after) topology switching to evade detection; (ii) cooperate with a
concurrent stealthy topology attack that alters network topology
at switching times, such that the original ZDA is feasible under
the corrupted topology. We first systematically study the proposed
ZDA variations, and then develop defense strategies against
them under the realistic assumption that the defender has no
knowledge of attack starting, pausing, and resuming times and
the number of misbehaving agents. Particularly, we characterize
conditions for detectability of the proposed ZDA variations, in
terms of the network topologies to be maintained, the set of
agents to be monitored, and the measurements of the monitored
agents that should be extracted, while simultaneously preserving
the privacy of the states of the non-monitored agents. We then
propose an attack detection algorithm based on the Luenberger
observer, using the characterized detectability conditions. We
provide numerical simulation results to demonstrate our theo-
retical findings.
Index Terms—Multi-agent systems, security, privacy, zero-
dynamics attack, topology attack, attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
OORDINATION and control of networked systems is
a well-studied theoretical problem (see e.g., [2]–[4])
with many practical applications including decentralized com-
putation [5], distributed optimization [6], power sharing for
droop-controlled inverters in islanded microgrids [7], clock
synchronization for sensor networks [8], as well as connected
vehicles [9], spacecrafts [10], robots [11], and electrical power
networks [12], [13].
Security concerns regarding the aforementioned networked
systems pose a formidable threat to their wide deployment,
as highlighted by the recent incidents including distributed
denial-of-service (DDOS) attack on Estonian web sites [14],
Maroochy water breach [15], and cyber attacks on smart
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grids [16]. The “networked” aspect exacerbates the difficulty
of securing these systems, since centralized measurement
(sensing) and control are not feasible for such large-scale
systems [17], and hence require the development of decen-
tralized approaches, which are inherently prone to attacks.
Particularly, a special class of ”stealthy” attacks, namely the
“zero-dynamics attack” (ZDA), poses a significant security
challenge [18]–[20]. The main idea behind ZDA is to hide the
attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation
of the control system so that it cannot be detected by applying
conventional detection methods on the observation signal
(hence, the name “stealthy”). The objective of such an attack
can vary from manipulating the controller to accept false data
that would yield the system towards a desired (e.g., unstable)
state to maliciously altering system dynamics (topology attack)
to affect the system trajectory.
Recent research efforts have focused on variations of ZDA
for systems with distinct properties. For stochastic cyber-
physical systems, Park et al. [21] designed a robust ZDA,
where the attack-detection signal is guaranteed to stay be-
low a threshold over a finite horizon. In [22], Kim et al.
proposed a discretized ZDA for the sampled-data control
systems, where the attack-detection signal is constantly zero
at the sampling times. Another interesting line of research
pertains to developing defense strategies [17], [23]–[26]. For
example, Jafarnejadsani et al. [19], [27] proposed a multi-rate
L1 adaptive controller that can detect ZDA in the sampled-data
control systems by removing certain unstable zeros of discrete-
time systems [18], [20]. Back et al. [28] used “generalized
hold” to render the impact of bounded ZDA.
Most of the prior work on defense strategies for the original
ZDA builds on rather restrictive assumptions regarding the
connectivity of network topology and the number of the
misbehaving agents (i.e., the agents under attack) [17], [23]–
[25]. For example, the detection approach in [26] works only
for the scenario of single misbehaving agent in second-order
systems, while it requires the number of input-output linking
to be larger than the number of misbehaving agents in more
general multi-agent systems [17]. Teixeira et al. [29] showed
that the strategic changes in system dynamics could be used
by defender to detect ZDA, but it requires the attack-starting
times to be the initial time and known to defender. In other
words, the defense strategy fails to work if the attack-starting
time is designed to be not the initial time and the defender
has no such knowledge, as is practically the case for most
scenarios.
As a first step towards a practical ZDA defense strategy,
in [30], [31], strategic topology switching is proposed. This
2strategy is motivated by the feasibility of controlling com-
munication topology driven due to recent developments in
mobile computing, wireless communication and sensing [32],
[33]. We note, in passing, that the idea of using the changes
in the state-space dynamics to detect ZDA first appeared in
[34], albeit a realistic mechanism (e.g., switching the system
topology) to achieve that objective was only very recently
studied in [30], [31]. However, the defense strategy in [30],
[31] still relies on a naive attacker that does not take the
topology switching strategy of the defender into account.
In this paper, we systematically address this practically
important problem: what kind of ZDA strategies can an
informed attacker design against a topology-switching system
and what are the optimal defense strategies, beyond switching
the topology, against such intelligent attacks? We note that
we study these questions under realistic assumptions on the
capabilities of the defender, i.e., we assume that the defender
does not know the start, pause and resume times of the attack
or the number of misbehaving agents. We also assume that the
attacker is aware of the strategic changes in system dynamics.
Moreover, we assume that the defender has to preserve the
privacy of the outputs of the non-monitored agents, i.e., the
outputs should be unobservable, since it is assumed that the
attacker has access to the output signal. The following example
from coordination control illustrates our motivation to impose
this privacy constraint.
For the coordination control of multi-agent systems, see
e.g., the connected autonomous vehicles, the data of initial
positions and velocities can be used by the adversary to esti-
mate target location [35], and the individual initial positions
include individual home-base locations. Once the attacker has
access to the outputs of monitored agents and the system
is observable, the attacker can use current available data to
infer the global initial condition and global real-time system
state. From a perspective of stealthy topology attack design
(e.g., topology attack in smart grids [36] and software-defined
networks [37]), the attacker needs (estimated) real-time data
of some agents’ state to decide the target connection links
to attack. Unfortunately, the inferred global real-time system
state implies the largest scope of attackable connection links
exposed to the attacker. To reduce the feasible area of target
links for the cooperative ZDA (i.e., a ZDA variant proposed in
this paper which refers to ZDA in cooperation with a stealthy
topology attack), monitored outputs have to be constrained
to be unobservable to preserve the privacy of non-monitored
agents’ real-time states, consequently the global system state
and global initial condition.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the following policies
which can be used by the attacker to evade detection:
1) intermittently pause, update and resume ZDA according
to the knowledge of the sequence of topologies (inter-
mittent ZDA).
2) cooperatively work with a stealthy topology attack, such
that the original ZDA policy continues to be feasible
under the corrupted topology (cooperative ZDA).
In [1], we present our preliminary results on the conditions
for detectability of an intermittent ZDA. In this paper, building
on [1], we develop integrated defense strategies for both
intermittent and cooperative ZDA variants, in the presence of
privacy considerations. More specifically, we develop defense
strategies to address the following questions: what network
topology should be maintained, which agents should be mon-
itored and what measurements the monitored agents should
output, such that the intermittent and cooperative ZDA variants
are detectable, and at the same time, the privacy of non-
monitored agents’ real-time states are preserved? Based on
the answers of the questions above, we next propose a strate-
gic topology-switching algorithm to detect the ZDA variants
without requiring information on the number of misbehaving
agents or the start, pause, and resume times of the ZDA.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the prelim-
inaries and the problem formulation in Sections II and III,
respectively. In Section IV, we analyze the proposed ZDA
variants. In Section V, we characterize the conditions for
detectability of these ZDA variants. Based on this character-
ization, we develop an attack detection algorithm in Section
VI. Numerical simulation results are provided in Section VII,
and the concluding remarks and the future research directions
are discussed in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
R
n and Rm×n denote the set of n-dimensional real vec-
tors and the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices, re-
spectively. Let C denote the set of complex numbers. N
represents the set of the natural numbers and N0 = N ∪
{0}. Let 1n×n and 0n×n be the n × n-dimensional iden-
tity matrix and zero matrix, respectively. 1n ∈ Rn and
0n ∈ Rn denote the vector with all ones and the vector
with all zeros, respectively. The superscript ‘⊤’ stands for
matrix transpose. µP (A) denotes the induced P -norm matrix
measure of A ∈ Rn×n, with P > 0, i.e., µP (A) =
1
2 maxi=1,...,n
{
λi
(
P 1/2AP−1/2 + P−1/2A⊤P 1/2
)}
. ker (Q) ,
{y : Qy = 0n, Q ∈ Rn×n}, A−1F , {y : Ay ∈ F}. Also, |·|
denotes the cardinality of a set, or the modulus of a number.
V\K describes the complement set of K with respect to V.
λi (M) is i
th eigenvalue of matrix M . x(b)(t) stands for the
bth-order time derivative of x(t). For a matrix W ∈ Rn×n,
W k, [W ]i,j , [W ]i,:, and [W ]a:b,c:d denote the k
th power of
W , the element in row i and column j, the bth row, and the
sub-matrix formed by the entries in the ath through bth row
and the cth through dth column of W , respectively.
The interaction among n agents is modeled by an undirected
graph G , (V,E), where V , {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of
vertices that represents n agents and E ⊆ V× V is the set of
edges of the graph G. The weighted adjacency matrix A =
[aij ] ∈ Rn×n of the graph G is defined as aij = aji > 0 if
(i, j) ∈ E, and aij = aji = 0 otherwise. Assume that there
are no self-loops, i.e., for any i ∈ V, aii = 0. The Laplacian
matrix of graph G is defined as L , [lij ] ∈ Rn×n, where
lii ,
n∑
j=1
aij , and lij , −aij for i 6= j. The diameter m of
a graph is the longest shortest unweighted path between any
two vertices in the graph.
3B. Definitions
A second-order system consists of a population of n agents
whose dynamics are governed by the following equations:
x˙i (t) = vi (t) , (1a)
v˙i (t) = ui(t), i = 1, . . . , n (1b)
where xi(t) ∈ R is the position, vi(t) ∈ R is the velocity, and
ui(t) ∈ R is the local control input1. The broad applications
of its coordination control is the main motivation of this
paper considering the model (1). For coordination control, we
consider more representative average consensus.
We recall the definitions of consensus and ZDA to review
the control objective and the attack policy.
Definition 1: [44] The agents in the system (1) are said
to achieve the asymptotic consensus with final zero common
velocity if for any initial condition:
lim
t→∞
|xi (t)−xj (t)|=0 and lim
t→∞
|vi (t)|=0, ∀i, j ∈ V. (2)
Definition 2: [45] Consider the system in the presence of
attack signal g˘(t):
˙˘z (t) = Az˘ (t) +Bg˘(t), (3a)
y˘ (t) = Cz˘ (t) +Dg˘(t), (3b)
where z˘ (t) ∈ Rn¯, y˘ (t) ∈ Rm¯, g˘(t) ∈ Ro¯, A ∈ Rn¯×n¯, B ∈
Rn¯×o¯, C ∈ Rm¯×n¯, and D ∈ Rm¯×o¯. The attack signal g˘(t) =
geηt is a zero-dynamics attack if there exist a scalar η ∈ C,
and nonzero vectors z0 and g ∈ Ro¯, that satisfy[
z0
−g
]
∈ ker
([
η1n¯×n¯ −A B
−C D
])
. (4)
Moreover, the states and observed outputs of system (7) satisfy
y˘ (t) = y (t) , t ≥ 0 (5)
z˘ (t) = z (t) + z0e
ηt, (6)
where y (t) and z (t) are the output and state of the system (7)
in the absence of attacks, i.e., the dynamics:
z˙ (t) = Az (t) , (7a)
y (t) = Cz (t) . (7b)
C. Control Protocol
We borrow a control protocol that involves topology switch-
ing from [44], [46] to achieve the consensus (2) for the agents
in system (1):
ui(t) = −vi(t) +
∑
j∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (xj (t)− xi (t)), i ∈ V (8)
where σ(t) : [t0,∞)→ S , {1, . . . , s}, is the switching signal
of the interaction topology of the communication network;
a
σ(t)
ij is the entry of the weighted adjacency matrix that
describes the activated topology of communication graph.
1Several real-world networked systems that can be represented by (1)
including the second-order consensus [9], flocking [38], swarming [39],
velocity synchronization and regulation of relative distances [40], and their
applications in the decentralized formation control of mobile robots [41] and
spacecraft [42], and distributed continuous-time optimization [43], etc.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We let K ⊆ V denote the set of misbehaving agents, i.e.,
the agents whose local control inputs are under attack. For
simplicity, we let the increasingly ordered set M , {1, 2, . . .}
⊆ V denote the set of monitored agents. Since the outputs
of monitored agents in M are used for attack detection, M is
referred to as the set of detectors as well.
In this paper, we make the following assumptions on the
attacker and defender.
Assumption 1: The attacker
• is aware that the changes in system dynamics are used
by the defender (system operator);
• knows output matrix, initial topology and switching times
before the first topology switching;
• needs a non-negligible time to compute and update attack
policy and identify newly activated topology;
• can record the newly obtained knowledge of network
topology into his memory;
• knows the outputs of monitored agents in M, while does
not know the measurements of other agents in V/M.
Assumption 2: The defender
• designs the switching times (when to switch) and switch-
ing topologies (what topology to switch to);
• chooses candidate agents to monitor, i.e., the monitored
agent set M, for attack detection;
• knows that the states of systems in the absence of attacks
are continuous with respect to time, i.e., x (t−) = x (t) =
x (t+) and v (t−) = v (t) = v (t+);
• has no knowledge of the start, pause and resume times,
and the misbehaving agents.
Remark 1: ZDA policy (4) shows that the attacker does not
require the real-time outputs of monitored agents to obtain a
feasible attack strategy consisting of the false data z0, and the
parameters g and η of attack signal g˘(t). However, when ZDA
seeks cooperation with a stealthy topology attack in response
to strategic topology switching defense, then it needs the real-
time outputs to identify the target links to attack.
A. Topology Switching Strategy
The building block of our defense strategy for security is
periodic topology switching, i.e., there exists a period τ such
that
σ (t) = σ (t+ τ ) ∈ S. (9)
Remark 2: We note that periodic switching does not depend
on system state, i.e., switching times are independent of
the state. This is because that the attack signals injected
into control input may generate a Zeno behavior [47], [48],
such that the control protocol (8) becomes infeasible under
a state-dependent switching. Also, if the topology switching
is random, the defender needs to often send the generated
“random” information of network topology to the detec-
tor/estimator/observer in the cyber layer as well, which will
be subject to a cyber topology attack (incorrect information
of network topology is transmitted) [36], [37], [49]. To avoid
this type of cyber attack, the defender chooses here periodic
4topology switching, and preprogram the (repeated) periodic
switching sequence into the controlled links, and hence avoids
sending the topology information to the cyber layer during the
system operation.
For our defense strategy based on the periodic topology
switching (9), we define the following periodic sequence with
length of L:
L ,

σ(t0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ1
, σ(t1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2
, . . . , σ(tL−2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τL−1
, σ(tL−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τL

 , (10)
where τk denotes the dwell time of the activated topology
indexed by σ(tk−1), i.e., τk = tk − tk−1.
Next, we study whether the agents in the system (1) using
control input (8) can reach consensus under periodic topology
switching. We first recall the well-known property of Lapla-
cian matrix Lr of a connected undirected graph from [50]:
Q⊤r = Q
−1
r , (11a)
[Qr]1,1 = [Qr]2,1 = . . . = [Qr]|V|,1, (11b)
Q⊤r LrQr = diag {0, λ2(Lr), . . . , λn(Lr)} , Λr, (11c)
based on which, we define:
Υrs , Q
⊤
r LsQr, (12a)
As ,
[
0(|V|−1)×(|V|−1) 1(|V|−1)×(|V|−1)
−[Υrs]2:|V|,2:|V| −1(|V|−1)×(|V|−1)
]
. (12b)
Proposition 1: Consider the second-order multi-agent sys-
tem (1) with control input (8). If the switching topologies in
L (10) include one connected topology indexed by r ∈ S, there
always exists a periodic topology sequence (10) that satisfies
L∑
s=1
νsµP (As) < 0, (13)
where νs =
τs
τ with τ =
L∑
i=1
τi. Moreover, under the periodic
topology switching the consensus (2) can be achieved.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3: Proposition 1 implies that for any coupling
weights, there exists a feasible periodic topology switching
sequence for consensus. This is in sharp contrast with arbitrary
switching which limits magnitudes of coupling weights in
order to guarantee consensus [46].
B. System Description
Under periodic topology switching, the multi-agent system
in (1), with the control input given by (8) and the outputs of
monitored agents in M subject to the attack signal g˘i(t), can
be written as
˙˘xi(t)= v˘i(t) (14a)
˙˘vi(t)=−v˘i(t) +
∑
j∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (x˘j(t)−x˘i(t))+
{
g˘i(t), i∈K
0, i∈V\K
(14b)
y˘i(t)=ci1x˘i(t) + ci2v˘i(t) + dig˘i(t), i∈M (14c)
where ci1’s and ci2’s are constant coefficients designed by
the defender (system operator), while di’s are coefficients
designed by the attacker.
Remark 4: The model in (14b) implies that there are two
practical approaches to attack the local control inputs: (i)
the attacker directly inject the attack signal to the control
architectures of misbehaving agents (target agents) in K; (ii)
the attacker injects attack signals to the data sent to controller
through breaking the encryption algorithm that protects the
communication channels with misbehaving agents.
The system in (14) can be equivalently expressed as a
switched system under attack:
˙˘z (t) = Aσ(t)z˘ (t) + g˘ (t) (15a)
y˘ (t) = Cz˘(t) +Dg˘ (t) , (15b)
where
z˘ (t),
[
x˘1 (t) . . . x˘|V| (t) v˘1 (t) . . . v˘|V| (t)
]⊤
, (16a)
Aσ(t),
[
0|V|×|V| 1|V|×|V|
−Lσ(t) −1|V|×|V|
]
, (16b)
C,
[
C1 C2
]
, (16c)
Cj,
[
diag
{
c1j , . . . , c|M|j
}
0|M|×(|V|−|M|)
]
, j=1, 2 (16d)
D,
[
0|M|×|V| diag
{
d1, . . . , d|M|
}
0|M|×(|V|−|M|)
]
, (16e)
g˘(t),
[
0⊤|V| g¯
⊤(t)
]⊤
, (16f)
[g¯ (t)]i,
{
g˘i (t) , i ∈ K
0, i ∈ V\K.
(16g)
In addition, we consider the system (15) in the absence of
attacks, which is given by
z˙ (t) = Aσ(t)z (t) , (17a)
y (t) = Cz(t). (17b)
C. Privacy of Initial Condition and Global System State
For secure multi-agent systems, see e.g., connected au-
tonomous vehicles, the initial conditions should be kept confi-
dential from an adversary since the individual initial positions
contain the information of home-base locations, and data of
initial positions and velocities can be used by the adversary to
estimate the target locations [35]. The following two examples
illustrate that the global initial condition as well as the global
system state play an important role in stealthy attacks.
Example 1 (Attack Objective): The state solution under
attack (6) implies that if η = 0, attacker’s objective is to
modify the steady-state value. If the attack objective is to
modify the target location to a new location that the attacker
desires, the attacker must know the original target location
in the absence of attacks. Under undirected communication,
it is straightforward to verify from the system (1) with its
control input (8) that 1|V|
∑
i∈V
v˙i(t) = −
1
|V|
∑
i∈V
vi(t), which
implies that the average position x¯(t)
∆
= 1|V|
∑
i∈V
xi (t) proceeds
with the average velocity v¯(t)
∆
= 1|V|
∑
i∈V
vi(t) = e
−tv¯(t0),
5which indicates that when the consensus is achieved, all of
the individual agents synchronize to the target location:
x∗ = lim
t→∞
(
x¯(tt0) +
(
1−e−t
)
v¯(t0)
)
= x¯(t0) + v¯(t0). (18)
Unfortunately (18) shows that the original target location can
simply be computed through a simple mean computation, once
the global initial condition is known (i.e., initial positions and
velocities of all agents).
Example 2 (Stealthy Topology Attack Design): Stealthy
topology attack design, as in smart grids [36] and power
networks [49], requires (estimated) real-time data of system
states to choose the target connection links to attack, such
that the system dynamics could be maliciously altered to
achieve the attack objective. Once the attacker can record the
newly obtained knowledge of the network topology, she has
the memory of the past topologies of the switching sequence.
Whenever the data on the global initial condition z (t0) (or
real-time global state z (t)) is available, the attacker can infer
the exact real-time global state z (t) (or global initial condition
z (t0)) through
z(t) = e
A
σ(tk)
(t−tk)
k−1∏
l=0
e
A
σ(tl)
(tl+1−tl)z (t0) , t ∈ [tk, tk+1)
which would be used whenever ZDA seeks cooperation with
stealthy topology attack to evade detection. Therefore, the
private global initial condition or system state can reduce the
scope of target links for stealthy topology attack.
We now impose the following unobservability condition
on the monitored outputs to preserve the privacy of non-
monitored agents, such that the attacker cannot use the avail-
able (monitored) outputs to infer any non-monitored agent’s
full state (and consequently, the global system state and initial
condition).
Lemma 1: For the system (17), xi(t) and vi(t), ∀i ∈ V\M,
are not simultaneously observable for any t ∈ [t0, t+m), if and
only if
∃p ∈ Nm1 : |pi|+
∣∣pi+|V|∣∣ 6= 0, ∀i ∈ V\M (19)
where
Nmm = ker (Om) , (20)
Nmq = ker(Oq)
⋂
e−Aσ(tq)τqNmq+1, 1 ≤ q ≤ m− 1 (21)
Oq ,
[
C⊤
(
CAσ(tq)
)⊤
. . .
(
CA
2|V|−1
σ(tq)
)⊤]⊤
. (22)
Proof: The condition in (19) implies that Nm1 6=
{
02|V|
}
.
Using Theorem 1 in [51], it follows that the system in (17)
is unobservable for any t ∈ [t0, t+m). Also, (19) implies that
pi 6= 0, and (or) pi+|V| 6= 0, and therefore the agent i’s position
and (or) velocity are (is) not partially observable.
Remark 5: Although the selection of the monitored output
coefficients in (14c) subject to (19) renders the system (14)
unobservable to preserve privacy, we will show that the
proposed ZDA variations become detectable using the outputs
yi(t)’s by careful selection of switching topologies and the set
of monitored agents.
IV. STEALTHY ATTACK MODEL
In the scenario where the attacker is aware of the detection
purpose of strategic changes in system dynamics induced by
topology switching [30], [31], the attacker can easily evolve
his attack policies in response to the strategic changes at
switching times to stay stealthy:
• “pause attack” before topology switching when the in-
coming topology is unknown or the attack policy (4)
is infeasible under the known incoming topology, and
“resume attack” after the feasibility of (updated) attack
policy under newly activated topology is verified;
• cooperate with a topology attack that can maliciously
alter network topology at switching times, such that the
original attack policy (4) continues to be feasible under
the corrupted topology.
In the following subsections, we give a systematic study on
these ZDA variations.
A. Intermittent Zero-Dynamics Attack
For convenience, we refer to T as the set of topologies under
which the attacker injects attack signals to control inputs, and
we refer to ξk and ζk as the attack-resuming and attack-
pausing times over the active topology intervals [tk, tk+1),
k ∈ N0, respectively.
The ZDA signals injected into the control input and mon-
itored output of system (14) with intermittent pausing and
resuming behavior are described as
g˘i(t) =
{
g
σ(tk)
i e
ησ(tk)(t−ξk), t∈ [ξk, ζk)⊆ [tk, tk+1)
0, otherwise.
(23)
To analyze this ZDA, we review the monitored output (14c)
at the first “pausing” time ζ0:
y˘i
(
ζ−0
)
= ci1x˘i(ζ
−
0 ) + ci2v˘i(ζ
−
0 ) + dig˘i
(
ζ−0
)
, ∀i∈M
which implies that y˘i
(
ζ−0
)
= y˘i (ζ0) if and only if
dig˘i
(
ζ−0
)
= dig˘i (ζ0), since v˘i
(
ζ−0
)
= v˘i (ζ0) and x˘i
(
ζ−0
)
=
x˘i (ζ0). Meanwhile, the defender knows that the velocity
and position states are always continuous with respect to
time, and hence the monitored outputs must be continuous
as well. Therefore, to avoid the “jump” on monitored outputs
to maintain the stealthy property (5), the attacker cannot
completely pause the attack, i.e., whenever the attacker pauses
injecting ZDA signals to control inputs at pausing time ζk, she
must continue to inject the same attack signals to monitored
outputs (14c):
y˘i (t)=ci1x˘i(t)+ci2v˘i(t)+di
k∑
m=0
g˘i
(
ζ−m
)
, t∈ [ζk, ξk+1) (24)
or equivalently,
y˘ (t) = Cz˘ (t) +D
k∑
m=0
g˘
(
ζ−m
)
, t ∈ [ζk, ξk+1) . (25)
6Based on the above analysis, for ZDA policy consisting
of “pause attack” and “resume attack” behaviors to remain
stealthy, it should satisfy (25) and
z (t0) ∈ N̂
k
1
⋂
N˜k1 , (26a)[
z (ξk)
−g˘ (ξk)
]
∈ ker (Pr) , ∀σ(ξk)∈T (26b)
where
N̂kk = ker(Ok), (27)
N̂kq = ker(Oq)
⋂
e−Aσ(tq)(τq−(ζq−ξq))Nmq+1, 1 ≤ q ≤ m−1
(28)
N˜kk = ker(O˜k), (29)
N˜kq = ker(O˜q)
⋂
e−Aσ(tq)(τq−(ζq−ξq))Nmq+1, 1 ≤ q ≤ m−1
(30)
O˜r ,
[
(CAr)
⊤ (
CA2r
)⊤
. . .
(
CA
2|V|
r
)⊤]⊤
, (31)
Pr ,
[
ηr12|V|×2|V| −Ar 12|V|×2|V|
−C D
]
, (32)
z =
[
x⊤ v⊤
]⊤
, z˘ − z =
[
x˘⊤ − x⊤ v˘⊤ − v⊤
]⊤
, (33)
and Or is defined in (22).
Proposition 2: Under the stealthy attack policy consisting
of (25) and (26), the states and monitored outputs of the
system (17) and the (15) in the presence of attack signal (23)
satisfy
y˘ (t) = y (t) , t ∈ [t0, tk+1) , (34)
z˘ (t) = z (t) + e
ησ(tk) (t−ξk)z (ξk), t ∈ [ξk, ζk) . (35)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 6: At first glance it might seem that the intermittent
ZDA is an asynchronous attack response to the strategic
topology switching, since the attacker knows only the initial
topology, and needs time to compute updated attack policy
and identify the newly activated network topology and the
target agents to attack. We note however that the attacker can
record the newly obtained knowledge of network topology
into her memory. Since the defender switches topologies
periodically, if the recorded length of topology sequence is
sufficiently long, the attacker can learn from her memory
the (recurring) periodic sequence, i.e., the attacker knows
all future switching topologies and times. The corresponding
future synchronous attack policies can be obtained offline.
Therefore, a synchronous attack response is possible only after
the attacker obtains the (recurring) periodic topology sequence
from her memory.
B. Cooperative Zero-Dynamics Attack
The objective of cooperation with stealthy topology attack
is to make the ZDA policy (4) continue to hold under the
corrupted topology. Unlike the class of false data injection
attacks (e.g., replay attack, ZDA), the topology attack changes
the dynamics of networked systems. Stealthy topology attack
can be of two types:
• Physical Topology Attack: the attacker maliciously al-
ters the the status of target connection links of phys-
ical systems, e.g., the bus interaction breaks in power
networks [49] and link fabrication in software-defined
networks [37];
• Cyber Topology Attack: the attacker maliciously alters
the information of network topology sent to the estima-
tor/observer/detector [36], [52].
As stated in Subsection III-A, the basis of our defense
strategy is the periodic topology switching, and the defender
(system) would preprogram the repeated switching times and
topologies into the controlled links of the real system and
observer/detector. In this case, the operator of real system
does not need to send the information of topology to the
observer/detector when the system operates. Therefore, the
system under our defense strategy is not subject to cyber
topology attack, and it is subject to physical topology attack.
We let tk+1 denote the switching time when ZDA cooper-
ates with topology attack. The multi-agent system (15) in the
presence of such cooperative attacks is described by
˙˘z (t) = Âσ(t)z˘ (t) + g˘ (t) , t ∈ [tk+1, tk+2) (36a)
y˘ (t) = Cz˘(t) +Dg˘ (t) , (36b)
where Âσ(t) is the system matrix under the physically cor-
rupted topology defined as
Âσ(t),
[
0|V|×|V| 1|V|×|V|
−L̂σ(t) −1|V|×|V|
]
, (37)
with L̂σ(tk+1) denoting the Laplacian matrix of the corrupted
topology. We describe its corresponding system in the absence
of ZDA, i.e., in the presence of the only physical topology
attack, as
˙̂z (t) = Âσ(t)ẑ (t) , t ∈ [tk+1, tk+2) (38a)
ŷ (t) = Cẑ (t) . (38b)
If g˘ (t) is a ZDA signal in systems (15) and (36) at times
t−k+1 and tk+1, respectively, by (6), we have z˘ (tk+1) =
z˘
(
t−k+1
)
= z
(
t−k+1
)
+ z0e
ηtk+1 and z˘
(
t−k+1
)
= z˘ (tk+1) =
ẑ (tk+1) + z0e
ηtk+1 . Here, we conclude that
ẑ (tk+1) = z
(
t−k+1
)
= z (tk+1) , (39)
otherwise, the system state z˘ (tk+1) has “jump” behavior,
which contradicts with the fact that z˘(·) is continuous.
The equation (39) and the stealthy property (5) imply that
Cz˘ (tk+1) = Cz (tk+1) = Cẑ (tk+1), based on which, a
necessary condition for the existence of ZDA under corrupted
topology is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Consider the systems in (38) and (17). We
have y (t) = ŷ (t) for any t ∈ [tk+1, tk+2), if and only if
d∑
l=0
CÂlσ(tk+1)(Âσ(tk+1) −Aσ(tk+1))z
(d−l) (tk+1)
= 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N0. (40)
Proof: See Appendix D.
7We set d = 0, 1 and expand (40) out to obtain
C2
(
L̂σ(tk+1) − Lσ(tk+1)
)
x (tk+1) = 0|M|, (41a)
C2
(
L̂σ(tk+1) − Lσ(tk+1)
)
v (tk+1) = 0|M|. (41b)
The result (41) shows that like the stealthy topology attacks
in smart grids [36], [52] and software-defined networks [37],
the attacker needs some agents’ real-time state data to decide
the target links to attack, while the imposed condition (19)
implies that the attacker cannot simultaneously infer xi (tk+1)
and vi (tk+1), ∀i ∈ V\M, according to Lemma 1. Therefore,
there should be a scope of target connection links.
Without loss of generality, we express the difference of
Laplacian matrices in the form:
L̂σ(tk+1)−Lσ(tk+1)=
[
Lσ(tk+1) 0|D|×(|V|−|D|)
0(|V|−|D|)×|D| 0(|V|−|D|)×(|V|−|D|)
]
, (42)
where D denotes the set of agents in the sub-graph formed by
the target links to be possibly attacked, Lσ(tk+1) ∈ R
|D|×|D| is
the elementary row transformation of the Laplacian matrix of a
subgraph G of the difference graph generated by the corrupted
graph Ĝtk+1 of the attack topology and candidate graph Gtk+1
of the defender at time tk+1. We should note here that the
subgraph G is not necessarily connected.
Since C2 ∈ R|M|×|V| and Lσ(tk+1) ∈ R
|D|×|D|, the relations
in (19), (41), and (42) imply that the attacker can devise a
stealthy topology attack (without knowing the measurements
of the agents in V\M which are unavailable) only when the
scope of target links satisfies:
D ⊆M. (43)
V. DETECTABILITY OF STEALTHY ATTACKS
Based on the systematic study of the attack behaviors in
Section IV, in this section, we investigate the detectability of
the proposed ZDA variants.
A. Detectability of Intermittent ZDA
We first define
Uri , diag
{
[Qr]i,1, . . . , [Qr]i,|V|
}
Q⊤r , (44)
F ,
{
i| [Qr]i,j 6= 0, i ∈ M, ∀j ∈ V, ∀r ∈ L
}
, (45)
where Qr satisfies (11).
Strategy on Switching Topologies:
Lr has distinct eigenvalues for ∀r ∈ L.
Strategy on Monitored-Agent Locations : F 6= ∅.
Defense Strategy Against Intermittent ZDA
(46)
(47)
Theorem 1: Consider the system (14) in the presence of
attack signals (23). Under the defense strategy against inter-
mittent ZDA,
• if the monitored agents output the full observations of
their velocities (i.e., ci1 = 0 and ci2 6= 0 for ∀i ∈ M),
the intermittent zero-dynamics attack is detectable and
N∞1 =
{
02|V|,
[
1⊤|V| 0
⊤
|V|
]⊤}
; (48)
• if the monitored agents output the full observations of
their positions (i.e., ci1 6= 0 and ci2 = 0 for ∀i ∈M), the
intermittent zero-dynamics attack is detectable but
N∞1 =
{
02|V|
}
; (49)
• if the monitored agents output the partial observations
(i.e., ci1 6= 0 and ci2 6= 0 for ∀i ∈M), and ci1 = ci2, ∀i ∈
M, the kernel of the observability matrix satisfies
N∞1 =
{
02|V|,
[
1⊤|V| −1
⊤
|V|
]⊤}
; (50)
and the intermittent ZDA is detectable if
ξ0 > t0 or D = 0|M|×2|V|, (51)
where N∞1 is computed recursively by (20) and (21).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Under the defense strategy consisting of (46) and (47),
the result (49) means if the monitored agents output full
observations of position, the system (17) is observable at any
time t > t0. As a result, using the available data (5), the
attacker can infer the global system state and the global initial
condition. While the results (48) and (50) show that if the
monitored agents output full observations of velocity or partial
observations, the condition (19) of Lemma 1 is satisfied, and
thus, the privacy of full states of non-monitored agents are
preserved. Therefore, for the purpose of privacy preserving
of non-monitored agents’ states, consequently, restricting the
scope of target links of stealthy topology attack, the defender
(system operator) has to abandon full observation of position.
Therefore, we only consider the full observation of velocity
or the partial observation in deriving the defense strategies
against the cooperative ZDA.
B. Detectability of Cooperative ZDA
Considering the matrix Qr satisfying (11), we describe the
defense strategy as follows:
Strategy on Switching Topologies:(46)
Strategy on Monitored Agents: ci2 > 0, ∀i∈M,
[Qr]i,m−[Qr]j,m6=0, ∀m∈V\{1}, ∀r∈L, ∀i 6=j∈M.
Defense Strategy Against Cooperative ZDA
(52)
(53)
Theorem 2: Consider the system (36) in the presence of
zero-dynamics attack in cooperation with topology attack
under (43). Under the defense strategy given by (46), (52)
and (53), the cooperative ZDA is detectable when the system
in the absence of attacks operates with non-identical initial
conditions.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remark 7: Theorem 2 implies that the cooperative ZDA is
undetectable only in the case of identical initial conditions,
i.e., xi (t0) = xj (t0) and vi (t0) = vj (t0), ∀i 6= j ∈ V, In
this case, the operating multi-agent system (17a) with (16b)
degenerates to a single system x¨i (t) = −vi (t), ∀i ∈ V, which
is an unrealistic scenario, especially, in large-scale networked
systems.
8Remark 8: The common critical requirement of our de-
fense strategies is that the undirected communication network
has distinct Laplacian eigenvalues. There indeed exist many
topologies whose associated Laplacian matrices have distinct
eigenvalues. The following lemma provides a guide to design
such topologies:
Lemma 2 (Proposition 1.3.3 in [50]): Let G be a connected
graph with diameter m. Then, G has at least m + 1 distinct
Laplace eigenvalues.
VI. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
Using the proposed defense strategies and the detectability
condition in Section V, this section focuses on the attack
detection algorithm that is based on a Luenberger observer.
A. Luenberger Observer under Switching Topology
We now present a Luenberger observer [53]:
qi (t) = wi (t) (54a)
w˙i(t) = −wi (t) +
∑
i∈V
a
σ(t)
ij (qj(t)− qi(t))
−


ri(t), ci1 6= 0, i∈M∫ t
t0
ri(s)ds, ci1 = 0, i∈M
0, i∈V\M
(54b)
ri(t) = ci1qi(t) + ci2wi(t)−y˘i(t), i∈M (54c)
where y˘i(t) is the monitored output of agent i in system (14),
ri (t) is the attack-detection signal. We also have q(t0) =
x˘(t0) + f̂ and w(t0) = v˘(t0) + f˜ , which implies that the data
of initial condition sent to the observer is subject to attack (f̂
and f˜ are injecting false data) as well.
We next consider a system matrix related to the system (54)
in the absence of attacks:
Âr ,
[
0|V|×|V| 1|V|×|V|
−Lr − Ĉ −1|V|×|V|
]
, (55)
where
Ĉ ,
[
C1
0(|V|−|M|)×|V|
]
or
[
C2
0(|V|−|M|)×|V|
]
(56)
with C1 and C2 given by (16d). It is straightforward to obtain
the following result regarding the matrix stability.
Lemma 3: The matrix Âr defined by (55) is Hurwitz, if Lr
is the Laplacian matrix of a connected graph and
0|V|×|V| 6= Ĉ ≥ 0. (57)
For the periodic switching sequence (10), if the switching
topology has one connected graph and gain matrix Ĉ (56)
satisfies (57), it follows from Lemma 3 that there exists a
P > 0, such that under convex linear combination the matrix
measure satisfies
L∑
s=1
νsµP
(
Âs
)
< 0. (58)
Algorithm 1: Strategic Topology Switching
Input: Initial index k = 0, initial time tk = 0, observer
gains satisfying (57), periodic sequence L (10)
with length of L satisfying (13) and (58).
1 Run the system (14) and the observer (54);
2 Update dwell time: τσ(tk) ← τσ(tmod(k,L+1));
3 Update topologies of system (14) and observer (54):
σ(tk + τσ(tk))← L (mod (k + 1, L)) ;
at switching time tk + τσ(tk);
4 Update topology-switching time: tk ← tk + τσ(tk);
5 Update iteration index: k ← k + 1;
6 Go to Step 2.
B. Strategic Topology-Switching Algorithm
We next propose a strategic topology switching algorithm
(Algorithm 1).
Theorem 3: If the monitored agents satisfy (47), (52) and
(53), and the switching topologies in L satisfy (46),
• without requiring the knowledge of the misbehaving
agents and the start, pause, and resume times of the
attack,
1) with ci1 = 0, ∀i ∈ M, the observer (54) is able to
detect the intermittent and cooperative ZDAs;
2) with ci1 = ci2, ∀i ∈ M, the observer (54) is able to
detect the cooperative ZDA and intermittent ZDA
under (51);
• in the absence of attacks, the agents in system (14)
achieve the asymptotic consensus, and the observer (54)
asymptotically tracks the real system (15) if ci1 = ci2,
∀i ∈ M, or ci1 = 0 and pi(t0)− xi(t0) = 0, ∀i ∈M.
Proof: See Appendix G.
VII. SIMULATION
We consider a system with n = 16 agents. The initial
position and velocity conditions are chosen randomly as
x(t0) = [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4]
⊤
and v(t0) =
[6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8]⊤. The coupling weights
and observer gains are uniformly set as ones. The considered
network topologies are given in the following Figures 1 and 4
where the agents 1, 2 and 3 are the monitored agents.
A. Detection of Intermittent ZDA
We first consider the periodic topology switching sequence:
La =

σ(t0) = 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ1=1
, σ(t1) = 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2=1
, σ(t2) = 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ3=2

 .
It can be shown that neither Topology 1 nor 2 in Figure 1 satis-
fies the defense strategy consisting of (46) and (47). Therefore,
the attacker can design an undetectable intermittent ZDA under
the provided periodic topology switching sequence:
• inject false data z(t0) = [0, 0, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−0.8, 0.8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]⊤to
the data of initial condition sent to observer (54);
9Figure 1. Network topologies for intermittent ZDA.
• inject ZDA signals g˘4 (t) = −2.44e0.8(t−0.2) and g˘5 (t) =
2.44e0.8(t−0.2) to the local control inputs of agents 4 and
5 for the initial Topology 1 at attack-starting time ξ0 =
0.2;
• pause ZDA before incoming Topology 2 that indicates
Topology 2 is unknown;
• update attack policy if necessary and resume the feasible
attack after topology finishes switching.
The trajectories of some agents’ positions and the attack-
detection signals in Figure 2 show that the designed intermit-
tent ZDA is not detected by the observer (54) under Algo-
rithm 1, and the stealthy attack renders the system unstable.
0 5 10 15
Time
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
In
di
vid
ua
l P
os
itio
ns
104 (a)
0 5 10 15
Time
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
D
et
ec
tio
n 
Si
gn
al
s
(b)
Figure 2. Trajectories of individual positions and attack-detection signals.
It is straightforward to show that Topology 3 and Topology
4 in Figure 1 satisfy the defense strategy consisting of (46) and
(47). Hence, we can turn to the following periodic topology
switching sequence at some time to detect the stealthy attack:
Lb =

σ(t0) = 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ1=1
, σ(t1) = 4︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2=1
, σ(t2) = 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ3=2

 .
Under the periodic sequence, the trajectories of attack-
detection signals in Figure 3 show that the observer (54)
succeeds in detecting the intermittent ZDA.
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Figure 3. Trajectories of individual positions and attack-detection signals.
B. Detection of Cooperative ZDA
Figure 4. Network topologies for cooperative ZDA.
One can easily verify that neither Topology 5 nor Topology
6 in Figure 4 satisfies the defense strategy consisting of (46),
(52) and (53). Therefore, it is possible that the attacker evades
detection if the periodic topology switching sequence is
Lc =

σ(t0) = 5︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ1=1
, σ(t1) = 6︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2=1
, σ(t2) = 5︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ3=2

 .
The stealthy cooperative ZDA is designed as follows:
• inject false data z(t0) = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
⊤
to the data
of initial condition sent to observer (54);
• inject ZDA signals g˘1 (t) = g˘3 (t) = g˘7 (t) = −et,
g˘4 (t) = 5e
t, g˘5 (t) = 2e
t and g˘6 (t) = 3e
t to the local
control inputs of agents 1, 3, 7, 4, 5 and 6, respectively,
at initial time;
• inject false data −et to the monitored outputs;
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• maliciously modify the incoming Topology 6 to the
corrupted Topology 7 in Figure 4 at incoming switching
time that indicates the incoming Topology 7 is unknown.
The trajectories of positions and attack-detection signals in
Figure 5 show that the designed attack makes system unstable
without being detected.
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Figure 5. Trajectories of individual positions and attack-detection signals.
It as well verifies that Topology 7 and Topology 8 in Fig-
ure 4 satisfy the defense strategy consisting of (46), (52) and
(53). Therefore, to detect the cooperative ZDA, we consider
the following periodic topology switching sequence:
Ld =

σ(t0) = 8︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ1=1
, σ(t1) = 9︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ2=1
, σ(t2) = 8︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ3=2

 .
We let the topology attacker modify Topology 9 to corrupted
Topology 10 in Figure 4, or any other one under its scope
of target links. The trajectories of attack-detection signals in
Figure 6 demonstrate that the observer (54) under Algorithm 1
succeeds in detecting the cooperative ZDA.
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Figure 6. Trajectories of individual positions and attack-detection signals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first introduced two ZDA variants for
a scenario where the attacker is informed about the switching
strategy of the defender: intermittent ZDA where the attacker
pauses, and updates and resumes ZDA in conjunction with the
knowledge of switching topology and dwell times, and coop-
erative ZDA where the attacker employs a stealthy topology
attack to render the switching topology defense ineffective.
We have then studied conditions for a defender to detect these
attacks, and subsequently based on these conditions, we have
proposed an attack detection algorithm. The proposed defense
strategy can detect both of the proposed ZDA variations, with-
out requiring any knowledge of the set of misbehaving agents
or the start, pause and resume times of the attack. Moreover,
this strategy achieves asymptotic consensus and tracking in
the absence of an attack without limiting the magnitudes of
the coupling weights or the number of monitored agents.
Our analysis suggests an interesting trade-off among the
switching cost, the duration of an undetected attack, the
convergence speed to consensus and tracking. Analyzing this
fundamental trade-off through the lens of game theory and
multi-objective optimization constitutes a part of our future
research.
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APPENDIX A
AUXILIARY LEMMAS
In this section, we present auxiliary lemmas that are used
in the proofs of the main results of this paper.
Lemma 4: [54] Consider the switched systems:
x˙ (t) = Aσ(t)x (t)
under periodic switching, i.e., σ (t) = σ (t+ τ ) ∈ S. If there
exists a convex combination of some matrix measure that
satisfies
L∑
m=1
νmµ (Am) < 0, (59)
where νs =
τs
L∑
i=1
τi
; then the switched system system is
uniformly asymptotically stable for every positive τ =
L∑
i=1
τi.
Lemma 5: [55] Consider the Vandermonde matrix:
H ,


1 1 · · · 1
a1 a2 · · · an
a21 a
2
2 · · · a
2
n
...
... · · ·
...
an−11 a
n−1
2 · · · a
n−1
n

 ∈ R
n×n.
Its determinant is det (H) = (−1)
n2−n
2
∏
i<j
(ai − aj).
Lemma 6: Consider the matrix Qr that satisfies (11). If
λ2(Lr) > 0, then
ker
([
Q⊤r
]
2:|V|,:
)
=
{
1|V|,0|V|
}
. (60)
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Proof: The proof follows from a contradiction argument.
We assume that (60) does not hold, i.e., there exists a vector
ψ = [ϕ1, . . . , ϕ|V|]
⊤ such that
ψ /∈ span
{
1|V|,0|V|
}
, (61)
and
[
Q⊤r
]
2:|V|,:
ψ = 0|V|−1. Then, it follows from (11) that
Lrψ = QrΛrQ
⊤
r ψ = Qr0|V| = 0|V|. (62)
From [50], we know that an undirected graph is connected
if and only if λ2(Lr) > 0, and further the null space of the
Laplacian matrix Lr of a connected graph is spanned by the
vector 1|V|. We obtain from (62) that ϕ1 = . . . = ϕ|V|, which
contradicts with (61). Thus, (60) holds. This concludes the
proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Based on average variables x¯(t)
∆
= 1|V|
∑
i∈V
xi (t) and v¯(t)
∆
=
1
|V|
∑
i∈V
vi(t), we define the following fluctuation terms:
x˜i (t) , xi (t)− x¯(t), (63a)
v˜i (t) , vi (t)− v¯(t), (63b)
which verifies that
1⊤|V|x˜ (t) = 0, for t ≥ t0 (64a)
1⊤|V|v˜ (t) = 0, for t ≥ t0. (64b)
The dynamics of the second-order multi-agent system (1)
with control input (8) can now be expressed equivalently as
˙˜x (t) = v˜ (t) (65a)
˙˜v (t) = −v˜ (t)− Lσ(t)x˜ (t) . (65b)
Let us define xˆ , Q⊤r x˜ and vˆ , Q
⊤
r v˜. Noting (11), the
dynamics (65) can equivalently transform to
˙ˆx (t) = vˆ (t) (66a)
˙ˆv (t) = −vˆ (t)−Υrsxˆ (t) , r, s ∈ S (66b)
where Υrs is defined in (12a). We note that it fol-
lows from (64) and (11b) that xˆ1 (t) = vˆ1 (t) = 0,
[Υrs]1,: = 0
⊤
|V| and [Υrs]:,1 = 0|V|. Let us define θ ,[
xˆ2 . . . xˆ|V| vˆ2 . . . vˆ|V|
]⊤
. Thus, the system (66)
equivalently reduces to
θ˙ (t) = Asθ (t) , s ∈ S (67)
with As given in (12b). Meanwhile, it is straightforward to
verify that when r = s, As is Hurwitz. Therefore, the exists
a P > 0 such that µP (Ar) < 0. Through setting on the
dwell time of the topology indexed by r, (59) can be satisfied.
By Lemma 4, the system (91) is uniformly asymptotically
stable, i.e., for any initial condition, lim
t→∞
θ (t) = 02|V|−2,
which means that lim
t→∞
Q⊤x˜ (t) = lim
t→∞
Q⊤v˜ (t) = 0|V|.
Since Q is full-rank, we have lim
t→∞
x˜ (t) = lim
t→∞
v˜ (t) =
0|V|. Then, (63) implies that lim
t→∞
x˜i (t) = lim
t→∞
x˜j (t) and
lim
t→∞
v˜i (t) = lim
t→∞
v˜j (t) , ∀i 6= j ∈ V. Here, we can conclude
that second-order consensus is achieved, and we can define
v∗ = lim
t→∞
v˜i (t) , ∀i ∈ V. Then, substituting the second-order
consensus into the system (1) with control input (8) yields the
dynamics v˙∗ = −v∗, which implies a common zero velocity.
Thus, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let us first define:
y
∆
= y˘ − y. (68)
It is straightforward to obtain dynamics from (3) and (7) as
z˙ (t) = Aσ(t)z (t) + g˘ (t) (69a)
y (t) = Cz (t) +Dg˘ (t) , (69b)
where z (t) is defined in (33).
A. Proof of (35)
Since [ξk, ζk) ⊆ [tk, tk+1), σ(t) = r for t ∈ [ξk, ζk). We
denote Ξ (s) , L {z (t)}, where L(·) stands for the Laplace
transform operator. It follows from the attack signal (23) that
L {g˘(t)} = (e−ξks − e−ζks) g˘(ξk)s−ηr , t ∈ [ξk, ζk). Without loss
of generality, we let σ(t) = r for t ∈ [tk, tk+1). Then, the
Laplace transform of the dynamics in (69) is obtained as
(e−ξks − e−ζks)(sΞ (s)− z(ξk)) (70)
= (e−ξks − e−ζks)ArΞ (s) + (e
−ξks − e−ζks)
g˘(ξk)
s− ηr
,
which is equivalent to
(e−ξks−e−ζks)Ξ(s)=
(e−ξks−e−ζks)
s12|V|×2|V|−Ar
(
z (ξk)+
g˘(ξk)
s−ηr
)
. (71)
Expanding (26b) out yields
Cz (ξk) +Dg˘ (ξk) = 0|M|, (72)
ηrz (ξk)−Arz (ξk) = g˘ (ξk) , r ∈ T. (73)
Substituting (73) into (71) yields (e−ξks − e−ζks)Ξ (s) =
(e−ξks−e−ζks)
s−ηr
z (ξk), and the inverse Laplace transform of it
gives (35).
B. Proof of (5)
It follows from (35) and (69) that
y(t)=eηr(t−ξk) (Cz(ξk)+Dg˘(ξk)) , t∈ [ξk, ζk) , k∈N0 (74)
which combined with (72) results in y (t) = 0|M|, or equiva-
lently, y˘ (t) = y (t), for any t ∈ [ξk, ζk).
We next prove (5) over non-attack interval of ZDA
[ζk, ξk+1). From (23) and (25), the dynamics (69) over such
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non-attack intervals of ZDA (subject to the monitored output
attack as (25)) is described by
z˙ (t) = Aσ(t)z (t) (75a)
y (t) = Cz (t) +D
k∑
m=0
g˘
(
ζ−m
)
, t ∈ [ζk, ξk+1) . (75b)
It follows from (35) and (75a) that
z(t) (76)
=


e
A
σ(tk)
(t−tk)
z (tk) , t∈[tk, ξk)
e
12|V|×2|V|ηr(t−ξk)+Aσ(tk)
(ξk−tk)
z (tk) , t∈[ξk, ζk)
e
A
σ(tk)
(t−tk−(ζk−ξk))+12|V|×2|V|ηr(ζk−ξk)z(tk), t∈[ζk, tk+1).
For D = 0|M|×2|V|, we note that (34) means that the
system (75) is unobservable for any t ∈ [t0, tk+1), ∀k ∈ N0.
Considering (76) and following the same proof of Theorem 1
of [51], we conclude that (34) holds if and only if
z (t0) ∈ N̂
k
1 , (77)
where N̂k1 is computed by (27) and (28).
For D 6= 0|M|×2|V|, it follows from (72) and (75b) that
y (ζk) = y
(
ζ−k
)
= 0|M|. Considering (76) and following the
same proof of Theorem 1 of [51], we conclude that (34) holds
if and only if
z (t0) ∈ N˜
k
1 , (78)
where N˜k1 is computed by (29) and (30).
In addition to (77) and (78), we conclude that if (26a) is
satisfied, regardless of D
k∑
m=0
g˘ (ζ−m) 6= 0|M| or = 0|M|, (34)
always holds.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let us define e˜(t) ,
[
e˜⊤x(t) e˜
⊤
v(t)
]⊤
, ẑ (t) − z (t).
Without loss of generality, we let σ(tk+1) = s. Noticing (39),
we obtain from the dynamics (38) and (17) that
˙˜e (t) = Âse˜ (t)+(Âs−As)z (t) , t∈ [tk+1, tk+2) (79a)
ŷ (t)−y (t) = Ce˜ (t) , (79b)
e˜ (tk+1) = 0|M|, (79c)
from which we have
ŷ (t)−y (t)=CeÂs(t−tk+1)
∫ t
tk+1
e−Âs(τ−tk+1)
(
(Âs−As)z (τ)
)
dτ,
and the corresponding derivatives
ŷ(d) (t)− y(d) (t)
= CÂdse
Âs(t−tk+1)
∫ t
tk+1
e−Âs(τ−tk+1)
(
Âs−As
)
z (τ)dτ
+
d−1∑
l=0
CÂls
((
Âs −As
)
z(d−1−l) (t)
)
. (80)
We note that under corrupted topology, the stealthy property
ŷ (t) − y (t) = 0|M| for any t ∈ [tk+1, tk+2) is equivalent to
ŷ(d) (tk+1)−y(d) (tk+1) = 0|M| for ∀d ∈ N0, which is further
equivalent to (40) by considering the solution (80).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Without loss of generality, we let σ(ζk) = r ∈ T, and ζk <
tk+1, k ∈ N, i.e., attacker “pauses” ZDA at ζk. We now prove
this theorem via a contradiction. Furthermore, we assume that
the attack is not detectable over the interval [ζ−k , ξk+1), which
is equivalent to
y (t) = 0|M| for any t ∈ [ζ
−
k , ξk+1), (81)
where y (t) is defined in (68).
Considering the fact that given a differentiable function
f(t), f(t) = 0 for any t ∈ [a, b], if and only if f(a) = 0
and f (d)(a) = 0, ∀d ∈ N. We conclude from (75) that (81) at
time ζk is equivalent to
y(d)(ζk)=

Cz (ζk) +D
k∑
m=0
g˘ (ζ−m) = 0|M|, d = 0
CAdrz (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N.
(82)
With the definitions of Ar, C, D and z (·)
in (16b), (16c), (16e) and (33), the relation (82) can be
further rewritten under different forms of observation as
follows:
• Full Observation of Velocity, i.e., ci1 = 0, ∀i ∈ M,
C2v (ζk) +D
k∑
m=0
g˘
(
ζ−m
)
= 0|M| (83a)
C2v (ζk) + C2Lrx (ζk) = 0|M| (83b)
C2L
e
rv (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀e ∈ N (83c)
C2L
d
rx (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N≥2 (83d)
• Full Observation of Position, i.e., ci2 = 0, ∀i ∈ M,
C1x (ζk) +D
k∑
m=0
g˘
(
ζ−m
)
= 0|M| (84a)
C1L
e
rx (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀e ∈ N (84b)
C1L
d
rv (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N0 (84c)
• Partial Observation, i.e., ci1 6= 0 and ci2 6= 0, ∀i ∈ M,
C1x (ζk)+C2v (ζk)+D
k∑
m=0
g˘
(
ζ−m
)
=0|M|, (85a)
C1L
e
rx (ζk) + C2L
e
rv (ζk)=0|M|, ∀e∈N (85b)
(C1−C2)L
d
rv(ζk)−C2L
d+1
r x(ζk)=0|M|, ∀d∈N0. (85c)
Considering the definition of the vector z(t) in (33), and
its continuity with respect to time, i.e., z
(
ζ−k
)
= z (ζk), it
follows from (35) and (23) that at time ζ−k ,[
z (ζk)
−g˘
(
ζ−k
) ] = eηr(ζ−k −ξk) [ z (ξk)
−g˘ (ξk)
]
, (86)
which, in conjunction with the fact of eηr(ζ
−
k
−ξk) 6= 0 and the
condition (26b), results in[
z (ζk)
−g˘
(
ζ−k
) ] ∈ ker (Pk) . (87)
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With variables g˘(ζ−k ), g¯(ζ
−
k ), z (ζk), Ar and Pk defined
in (16f), (16g), (33), (16b) and (32), respectively, expand-
ing (87) yields
ηrx (ζk)− v (ζk) = 0|V|, (88)
−g¯
(
ζ−k
)
+ v(ζk) + Lrx (ζk) + ηrv(ζk) = 0|V|. (89)
Before proceeding the rest of proof, we define the variables:
Hi , [Urix (ζk)]2:|V|, (90a)
Dr , diag
{
λ22 (Lr) , . . . , λ
2
|V| (Lr)
}
, (90b)
H˜r ,


λ22(Lr) · · · λ
2
|V|(Lr)
λ32(Lr) · · · λ
3
|V|(Lr)
... · · ·
...
λ
|V|
2 (Lr) · · · λ
|V|
|V|(Lr)

 , (90c)
Hr ,


1 · · · 1
λ2(Lr) · · · λ|V|(Lr)
... · · ·
...
λ
|V|−2
2 (Lr) · · · λ
|V|−2
|V| (Lr)

 , (90d)
where Uri is given in (44).
A. Under Full Observation
Let us start with full observation of velocity. It follows
from (11) that Ldr = QrΛ
d
rQ
⊤
r with Λr given by (11). Thus,
(83d) is equivalent to C2QrΛ
d
rQ
⊤
r x (ζk) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N≥2,
which is further equivalent to
|V|∑
l=1
λdl (Lr)[Qr]i,l
[
Q⊤r
]
l,:
x (ζk) = 0, ∀d ∈ N, ∀i ∈ M (91)
with the consideration of the matrix C2 defined in (16d) with
ci2 6= 0, ∀i ∈M. Further, recalling H˜r, Hi and Uri from (90c),
(90a) and (44), from (91) we have
H˜rHi = 0|V|−1, ∀i ∈M. (92)
It can be verified from (90b)–(90d) that H˜r = HrDr, from
which we have det
(
H˜r
)
= det (Hr) det (Dr). The matrix
defined in (90b) shows if Lr has distinct eigenvalues, Dr is
full-rank. In addition, by Lemma 5, the Vandermonde matrix
Hr is full-rank; thus, H˜r is full-rank. Therefore, the solution
of (92) is
Hi = 0|V|−1, ∀i ∈ M. (93)
With the definitions in (44) and (90a), the equation (93)
indicates that for ∀i ∈ M,
diag
{
[Qr]i,2, . . . , [Qr]i,|V|
}[
Q⊤r
]
2:|V|,:
x (ζk)=0|V|−1. (94)
We note that (44), (45) and (47) imply that ∃i ∈ M :
diag
{
[Qr]i,2, . . . , [Qr]i,|V|
}
is full-rank. Thus, from (94) we
have
[
Q⊤r
]
2:|V|,:
x (ζk) = 0|V|−1. By Lemma 6, the solution
of (94) is
x1 (ζk) = . . . = x|V| (ζk) . (95)
Considering (83c), using the same method to derive (95), we
obtain
v1 (ζk) = . . . = v|V| (ζk) . (96)
Substituting (95) into (83b) yields C2v (ζk) = 0|M|, which
together with (96) results in
v1 (ζk) = . . . = v|V| (ζk) = 0. (97)
For the full observation of position, using nearly the same
analysis method employed above, we obtain the same results
as (95) and (97).
Substituting (95) and (97) into (89) yields g¯
(
ζ−k
)
= 0|V|,
and consequently, g˘
(
ζ−k
)
= 02|V|. This means that there is no
ZDA on the system at ζ−k , which contradicts the assumption
that the attack is applied until ζk. Therefore, we conclude
that under the full observation of position or velocity, the
intermittent ZDA is detectable.
To proceed with the proof of (48), we first need to obtain
ker(Ok) of the system (17) given in (22). The analysis of the
kernel of the observability matrix Ok can follow the relation
(82) with the setting of D = 0|M|×2|V|. We note that (82) is
equivalently represented by (83), (84) and (85). The results
(95) and (96) are obtained without considering (83a), (84a)
and (85a) which are the only terms involving D. Then, results
similar to (95) and (96) can be obtained for the system in (17)
as
x1 (ζk)= . . .=x|V| (ζk) and v1 (ζk)= . . .=v|V| (ζk) . (98)
Further, with D = 0|M|×2|V|, from (83a) with v (ζk) replaced
by v (ζk), we have C2v (ζk) = 0|M|, which combined with
(98) yields x1 (ζk) = . . . = x|V| (ζk) and v1 (ζk) = . . . =
v|V| (ζk) = 0. Thus, ker(Ok) =
{
02|V|,
[
1⊤|V| 0
⊤
|V|
]⊤}
. Since
all of the elements in ker(Ok) are the equilibrium points of
the system (17), through the computation of (20) and (21), we
arrive at (48).
To obtain ker(Ok) under full observation of position, we can
consider (84) with D = 0|M|×2|V|. From (84a) and (95) we
have x1 (ζk) = . . . = x|V| (ζk) = 0. Then, we obtain from (97)
(replace vi (ζk) by vi (ζk)) that ker(Ok) =
{
02|V|
}
, which
means that if the monitored agents output full observation of
positions, the system (17) is observable at tk; thus (49) is
obtained by computation of (20) and (21).
B. Under Partial Observation
The analysis of observability follows the same steps of
that under full observation. With C1 = C2, from (85c) we
have C2Ld+1r x(ζk) = 0, ∀d ∈ N0. Employing the same steps
to derive (95) under full observation of velocity, we obtain
(95) as well under partial observation. Moreover, substituting
(95) into (85b) and repeating the same steps, we arrive at
(96). It is straightforward to verify from the dynamics (17)
that x1 (t) = . . . = x|V| (t) and v1 (t) = . . . = v|V| (t)
for any t ≥ t0 if and only if (96) and (95) hold. Finally,
considering (85a) with the setting of D = 0|M|×2|V|, we
have C1x (ζk) + C2v (ζk) = 0|M|, from which we have
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ker(Ok) =
{
02|V|,
[
1⊤|V| −1
⊤
|V|
]⊤}
, ∀k ∈ N0, and then (50)
is obtained by computation of (20) and (21).
Under the condition (51), z (ζk) ∈ Nk1 , which in conjunc-
tion with (88) implies ηr = −1. Substituting (95), (96) and
ηr = −1 into (89) yields g¯
(
ζ−k
)
= 0|V|, and consequently,
g˘
(
ζ−k
)
= 02|V|. This means that there is no ZDA on the
system at ζ−k , which contradicts the assumption that the attack
is applied until ζk.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
With the definition of Cj , j = 1, 2, in (16d), we can
rewrite (79) as
˙˜ex (t) = e˜v (t) , (99a)
˙˜ev (t) = −e˜v (t)−L̂se˜x (t)−
(
L̂s−Ls
)
x (t) , (99b)
ŷ (t)− y (t) = C1e˜x (t) + C2e˜v (t) , t ∈ [tk+1, tk+2) (99c)
e˜x (tk+1) = 0|V|, e˜v (tk+1) = 0|V|. (99d)
We define C , diag
{
c12, . . . , c|D|2
}
, where the diagonal
entries are from C2 defined in (16d). According to (52) and
|D| ≤ |M| (implied by (43)), the matrix C is invertible. Now,
considering (42), we have
C2
(
L̂s − Ls
)
=
[
CLs 0|D|×(|M|−|D|)
0(|M|−|D|)×|D| 0(|M|−|D|)×(|M|−|D|)
]
, (100)
which, in conjunction with invertible matrix C and the def-
initions of As in (16b) and Âs in (37), implies that if
C2
(
L̂s − Ls
)
x(d) (tk+1) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N0, then(
Âs −As
)
z(d) (tk+1) = 02|V|, ∀d ∈ N0. (101)
Under the dynamics (99) and the relation (101), the nec-
essary condition (40) of guaranteeing stealthy property of
cooperative ZDA is equivalently written as
C2
(
L̂s − Ls
)
Ldsx (tk+1) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N0 (102a)
C2
(
L̂s − Ls
)
Ldsv (tk+1) = 0|M|, ∀d ∈ N0. (102b)
We assume that the topology attack in system (36) can
ensure that the stealthy property (5) of ZDA holds. Notic-
ing (100) and the dynamics (17), the equation (102) is
equivalent to CLσ(tk+1)χ
(m)(tk+1) = 0|D|, ∀m ∈ N0, where
χ(tk+1) ,
[
x1 (tk+1) . . . x|D| (tk+1)
]⊤
. Since C is in-
vertible, we have
Lσ(tk+1)χ
(m)(tk+1) = 0|D|, ∀m ∈ N0. (103)
As Lσ(tk+1) is the elementary row transformation of a
Laplacian matrix, there exists an elementary row operator
E ∈ R|D|×|D| such that L̂σ(tk+1) , ELσ(tk+1) is a Laplacian
matrix. Premultiplying both sides of (103) by E yields
L̂σ(tk+1)χ
(m)(tk+1) = 0|D|, ∀m ∈ N0. (104)
It is well-known that the null space of the Laplacian matrix of
a connected graph is spanned by the vector with all ones.
From (104) we conclude that ∃i, j ∈ D : x
(m)
i (tk+1) =
x
(m)
j (tk+1), tk+1 ≥ t0, ∀m ∈ N0, which can be rewritten as(
e⊤i − e
⊤
j
)
x(m) (tk+1) = 0, ∀m ∈ N0 (105)
where ei denotes a vector of length |D| with a single nonzero
entry with value 1 in its ith position.
Due to the dynamics (17), the equation (105) leads to(
e⊤i − e
⊤
j
)
Lmr x (tk+1) = 0, ∀m ∈ N0 (106a)(
e⊤i − e
⊤
j
)
Lmr v (tk+1) = 0, ∀m ∈ N0. (106b)
It follows from (11) that Ldr = QrΛ
d
rQ
⊤
r with Λr given
by (11), substituting which into (106) yields that for ∀m ∈ N,
|V|∑
l=2
λml (Lr)
(
[Qr]i,l−[Qr]i,l
)[
Q⊤r
]
l,:
x(tk+1)=0, (107a)
|V|∑
l=2
λml (Lr)
(
[Qr]i,l−[Qr]i,l
)[
Q⊤r
]
l,:
v(tk+1)=0. (107b)
Then, with the definitions
Dij,diag
{
[Qr]i,2 − [Qr]j,2, . . . , [Qr]i,|V| − [Qr]j,|V|
}
, (108)
f, [Qr]
⊤
2:|V|,: x (tk+1) , (109)
following the same derivations from (91) to (92), we arrive at
H˜rDijf = 0|V|−1, ∀i ∈ M, (110)
where H˜r is given in (90c). Using the same analysis to
derive (93), we conclude that under the condition (46), the
solution of (110) is Dijf = 0|V|−1. Since Dij given by (108)
is full-rank under the condition (53), we have f = 0|V|−1.
Then, noticing (109), by Lemma 6 we arrive at
x1 (tk+1) = . . . = x|V| (tk+1) . (111)
Repeating the same procedure of deriving (111) from (107a),
we conclude v1 (tk+1) = . . . = v|V| (tk+1) from (107b), which
means that the second-order consensus is achieved at tk+1, i.e.,
xi (tk+1) = xj (tk+1) and vi (tk+1) = vj (tk+1), ∀i 6= j ∈ V.
It is straightforward to verify from the dynamics (65) that
the second-order consensus is achieved at some time t < ∞
if and only if the individual initial conditions are identical,
i.e., xi (t0) = xj (t0) and vi (t0) = vj (t0). Hence, the
cooperative ZDA is undetectable only in the case of identical
initial condition.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We define ex (t) , q (t)− x˘ (t) and ev (t) , w (t)− v˘ (t).
The dynamics of tracking errors in the presence of the attack
obtained from (54) and (14) are given as:
e˙xi(t)=evi(t) , (112a)
e˙vi(t)=−evi(t) +
∑
i∈V
a
σ(t)
ij
(
exj(t)− exi(t)
)
−
{
g˘i(t), i∈K
0, i∈V\K
−


ri(t), ci1 6=0,i∈M∫ t
t0
ri(s)ds, ci1=0,i∈M
0, i∈V\M
(112b)
ri(t)=ci1exi(t) + ci2evi(t)− dig˘i(t) , i ∈ M. (112c)
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The attack is not detected by the observer (54) means that
ri (t) = 0, i ∈ M, for any t ≥ t0. Substituting it into the above
equation results in
e˙xi(t) = evi(t)
e˙vi(t) = −evi(t) +
∑
i∈V
a
σ(t)
ij
(
exj(t)− exi(t)
)
−
{
g˘i(t), i∈K
0, i∈V\K
ri(t) = ci1exi(t) + ci2evi(t)− dig˘i(t) , i ∈ M
which has the same form of dynamics as that of (14).
Therefore, the analysis of ZDA variations in the observer (54)
follows the same analysis of the system (14). Moreover, the
required condition (52) implies that the monitored agents
output full observations of velocity or partial observations:
either (48) or (50) implies (19). Hence, the topology attacker
cannot infer the real-time full states of the non-monitored
agents, and the topology attacker has to consider the scope of
the target connections implied by (43). Therefore, the proof
of the first statement follows from Theorems 1 and 2.
In the absence of attacks, the system matrix of system (112)
is Âσ(t) defined in (55). Since condition (46) implies that
all of the switching topologies provided to Algorithm 1 are
connected graphs and condition (52) implies (57), the matrix
Âσ(t) is Hurwitz by Lemma 3. Thus, there exists a P > 0
such that both (59) and (58) hold. Hence, the proof of the
second statement follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 3.
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